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ARGUMENT 
not the rights granted him under the Montana 
Parenting she was not compliance the Parenting Plan as written. 
she her non-compliance was excusable under the specific 
circumstances case at time of the non-compliance. 
Michelle's were not Kidnapping as defined by Idaho Code § 18-
4501(2). The statute is as applied in this case. In this case, a reasonable 
person could conclude that was not a "custodial parenC for purposes of Idaho's 
Kidnapping Parenting did not to him as a "custodial parent," 
and he never had "physical custody" of P .A. 
In construing Section 18-4501 this Court should apply the principles of 
strict construction lenity. Additionally, any interpretation of Section 18-4501 (2) 
should take into account the language of Section 18-4506. 
Idaho Code § 18-4501(2) is ambiguous because the term "custodial parent" 
has numerous reasonable interpretations. 
Each of the fifty states will has different understandings of what it means for a 
parent to have "custody. '" In its Response, the State has cited Idaho Code § 39-8202 as 
one definition of "custodial parent.'" According to that particular statute, a "custodial 
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parent" is "the parent with whom the child resides.,,1 Other statutes have different 
definitions depending on the context. 
If this Court were to accept Code § 39-8202 as the definition 
"custodial parent." 
that a "custodial parenC is 
was not a "custodial parent." Section 39-8202 states 
parent with whom the child resides" (as opposed to "a 
parent with \vhom the child resides"). Under this definition, a child "resides" with the 
parent with whom IS living at the time. Obviously, if the parents 
are living in different places, the chiid can only "reside" with one parent at a time. 
Additionally, the "custodial parent" is the parent with whom the child is currently 
residing, not the parent whom the child is scheduled to reside. Under this 
definition, in order to be the "custodial parent," he must be lhe custodial 
parent (to the exclusion Michelle), and P.A. must have been physically living with 
Ricky at the time of alleged kidnapping. 
Under the facts this particular case, "custodial parent" is undoubtedly 
ambiguous. The Plan was written in Montana and was written subject to that state's 
family-law construct. The Montana Parenting Plan never refers to Ricky as a having 
any kind of "custody." He was not granted "joint custody," "physical custody," or 
"legal custody." Ricky is granted certain parenting rights and is given "parenting 
time." The name "Ricky" and the term "custody" never appear together in the entire 
document. Based on the plain language of the Parenting Plan, it is perfectly reasonable 
for a person to conclude that Ricky was not a "custodial parent." 
1 Respondent's Brief. p.6 (emphasis added). 
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Ricky did not have physical custody of P at the time of the alleged 
kidnapping. 
Under 
date the Parenting 
parenting time. 
the time that P.A. was allegedly kidnapped, he resided exclusively 
to deliver to Ricky's physical custody: Michelle 
custody over P .A. for the entire time . was 
IS a case there was never any doubt that 
having legal 
case, Ricky's parenting time never started. From the 
Montana courL Ricky was never granted his 
several miles from and Michelle. 
The parties were supposed to drive several hours and meet at a gas station to 
at a gas station at the time he understood to be the exchange 
appointed 
showed 
Michelle never arrived. 
IS no that Michelle did not comply with the parenting plan. 
She violated the Parenting Plan and she denied Ricky his rights as stated under the 
Michelle's actions may have exposed her to civil liability and contempt 
proceedings. Additionally, it may be argued that Michelle ma;' have violated Idaho's 
Custodial Interference Statute. However, her to deliver P .A. to Ricky for 
Ricky's parenting time was not kidnapping. In this case, Ricky was scheduled to 
receive P .A., but Ricky never had "custody" over P .A. 
REPLY BRIEF -5-
This Court's decision could be narrowly crafted to the peculiar facts of this 
case. Under the peculiar facts 
that to 
from 









case, the Court is faced with a Parenting Plan 
to father. Ricky was granted "parenting 
is a case where parent 
kidnapped never received the child in 
the statutory construction 
construed. or narrowly construed. The 
"custodial" when it amended 
one must lead, take. entice away, or detain a 
State seeks to include Ricky in this definition. 
As stated was not given any "custody" under the Parenting Plan, 
and did not possession at the time of the alleged 
kidnapping. To include Ricky as a "custodial parent" is not a strict construction of 
Section 18-4501(2). 
"Ambiguities in Section j 8-4501 (1) should be resolved in favor of Michelle, the 
defendant. The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated, "well-settled principles of statutory 
construction require that, when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be strictly 
construed in favor of the defendant. This principle extends to the elements of the 
REPLY BRIEF -6-
substantive crime. An:v ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity." State r Roll, 
1 8 Idaho 936, 1 P 287. 1290 App., 1990), 
.). s Sections 1 501(2) 
together. 
Interference Statute and the 
term "custodial parent." Court has 
defined in pari as 
The statutes . materia are to be construed together means 
that each legislative act IS to be interpreted with other acts relating to 
the same matter or eel. Statutes are pari materia when they relate 
to same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as 
one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be 
inferred a code statutes relating to one subject was governed by 
one spmt policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious 
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of Jearning the 
intention. statutes relating to same subject are to be compared, 
and so far as still force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
State r. Barnes, P.2d 290, 294 (1 (quoting Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho L 4, 855 P.2d 465 (1993»). 
In Barnes, this Coun addressed the issue of when two separate statutes dealt 
with the operation of snow mobiles while under the influence. This Court found that 
the less severe statute dealt \vith driving snowmobiles generally, while the more 
severe STatute dealt with driving a snowmobile while intoxicated on a public street. 
Accordingly, the two statutes could be distinguished based on location of the alleged 
violation. 
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The State cites the Idaho Court of Appeals' case Stare v. Folsom, 139 Idaho 
627, 84 P .3d 563 (Idaho App. 2003). In Folsom, the legal issue before the Court 
Appeals was how to construe two statutes touching on the subjecTs of neglect and 
abandolLment of a vulnerable The Court perceived issue as follows: 
\Vhile both . §§ 18-1505 and 18-1505A criminalize the failure to 
provide care to a vulnerable adult there is a significant difference 
between mere neglect and felonious abandonment. Pursuant to the clear 
language of § 1 505A. we conclude that the crime of 
abandonment is committed when a caretaker affects a complete 
withdrawal care. length of time that care is withheld is a factor 
for the jury to consider in deciding \vhether an accused has abandoned, 
or merely neglected, the vulnerable adult. In addition, abandonment is 
distinguished mere neglect in that abandonment requires 
"deliberate disregard" the safety or welfare of the vulnerable adult. 
State 1'. Fa/sam, at 566-67. The Court reasoned that the distinction between 
the statutes was a distinction in severity: abandonment was more severe than neglect, 
and the jury would left to decide whether the defendant had neglected or abandoned 
the victim. 
Neither Barnes nor Folsom applies this case. Barnes dealt with two statutes 
that applied in different locales. Folsom dealt with two statutes that applied under 
different severities. In this case, the Coun is asked to compare Idaho's Custodial 
Interference Statute and Idaho's Kidnapping Statute, and interpret the Idaho 
Legislature's intent based on what the Kidnapping Statute omits. 
Section 18 -4501 (2) contains two imponant omissi ons-( 1) there are terms 
included Custodial Interference not included under the Kidnapping Statute, and 
there are defenses included under the Custodial Interference Statute not included 
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under the Kidnapping Statute. "Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a 
certain provision, the omission such provision from a similar statute concerning a 
related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed. ,. Kopp v. SWle, 





order" 1. § 18-4506. 
3 314 (1 
Statute covers a much broader array of 
includes "a parent 
such rights 
a merely custodial parent, but any 
custody, visitation or 
from temporary or permanent custody 
parent the absence of a custody 





guardian, or other person having lawful care or control.'· The 
UJ1,"U,HH Interference statute is entirely omitted. 
Statute omits the defenses Idaho Legislature 
Interference The Idaho Legislature recognized 
that there are justifications a parent to refuse to deliver a child to the other parent. 
The Legislature expressed those justifications as defenses. 
The Kidnapping Statute contains no such defenses. The Idaho Legislature 
intended that there be no justification for Kidnapping. In case, the reason Michelle 
failed to deliver P.A. over to Ricky was because of her concern for her son' s physical 
safety. The Idaho Legislature intended that individuals like Michelle, a mother who 
refuses to hand over her child out of concern for his safety, to be able to present her 
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verSIOn the facts. Charging Michelle Kidnapping eviscerates that intent, and 
prevents Michelle from presenting her rationale to the jury. 
Michelle not kidnap her son under Section 18-4501 She violated a 
parenting plan, and have interfered Ricky's parental rights, but she did 
not kidnap statute that Michelle is accused of committing is 
ambiguous , and it is certainly ambiguous how it would specifically apply 
to Michelle's case. 
For the reasons 
to exclude those 
the parenting 
alleged kidnapping, and 
and physical custody. 
DATED this 
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above, Section 18-4501 (2) should be narrowly construed 
the aggrieved parent is neither given "custody" in 
not have physi cal custody of the child at the time of the 
all eged kidnapper is the child's mother with both legal 
day January. 2012. 
PENDLEBURY OFFICE, P 
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I hereby certify on January 
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